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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the early twentieth century, working conditions in the United 
States were rough.  Employees worked long hours under dangerous 
conditions and received very little pay.1  People used the term sweating 
to describe these difficult working conditions.2  Sweating is defined as 
“the unfair exploitation by unscrupulous employers of the necessities of 
the poorer and more helpless class of workers by requiring them to work 
for wages inadequate to their needs or for excessive hours or under 
insanitary conditions.”3  Today, while working conditions have improved 
for most, the term sweating could still be used to describe conditions for 
a certain type of worker—unpaid interns. 
Abusive labor practices may not be as widespread or as visible as 
they were in the early twentieth century, but they are still a prevailing 
problem in the current intern labor market.  Illegal unpaid internships 
subject a countless number of workers to “unfair exploitation by 
unscrupulous employers.”4  The intern market is massive and so is the 
potential for abuse.  In the United States, it is estimated there are 
between 1 to 2 million interns and as many as 50 percent of these interns 
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may be unpaid.5  Of the roughly 1 million unpaid interns, it is unknown 
how many are actually misclassified employees performing illegal, 
unpaid labor for the benefit of an employer.  This is unknown because of 
the high degree of legal uncertainty over what constitutes an internship.  
Until recently, this uncertainty was not apparent because internships had 
operated for decades without facing any serious legal challenges.6  
However, in 2013, two cases in the U.S. Southern District of New York, 
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc.7 and Xuedan Wang v. Hearst 
Corp.,8 brought attention to the issue and led to an explosion of lawsuits 
filed by former interns against employers.9  In light of this recent 
litigation, courts cannot agree on what legal standard should apply to 
determine whether an intern should be classified as a trainee who is 
exempt from federal wage and hour requirements or as an employee who 
is entitled to wage and hour protections.  Different courts have applied 
conflicting standards and the Department of Labor (DOL) has suggested 
its own standard.  These conflicting standards have created uncertainty as 
to the legal status of internships.  The longer this uncertainty lingers, the 
worse it is for employers, interns, employees, and the job market overall. 
This Comment discusses the legal uncertainty over private sector 
internships and proposes the enactment of a clear, unambiguous 
regulatory provision to resolve the uncertainty.  The Comment begins in 
Part II by discussing the background of federal wage laws and how they 
apply to interns.  Next, it considers the different, conflicting standards 
courts are currently applying to unpaid internships.  Part III offers a 
solution to the uncertainty by proposing that the DOL enact a regulatory 
provision that establishes a clear, unambiguous, all or nothing six-prong 
test for determining when an intern is exempt from federal wage and 
hour requirements. 
                                                          
 5. ROSS PERLIN, INTERN NATION: HOW TO EARN NOTHING AND LEARN LITTLE IN THE BRAVE 
NEW ECONOMY 27–28 (2011).  This estimate does not account for internships taken by community 
college students, graduate students, or recent graduates.  Id. 
 6. Jeff P. Dunlaevy, “Research Me a Cup of Coffee and a Cinnamon Scone!” Unpaid 
Internships Pose Major Legal Risks, but Are Law Firms Exempt?, S.C. LAW, May 2014, at 44. 
 7. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), reh’g granted in 
part, No. 11 Civ. 6784 WHP, 2013 WL 4834428 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2013), mot. to certify appeal 
granted, No. 11 Civ. 6784 WHP, 2013 WL 5405696 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013). 
 8. Xuedan Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), mot. to certify appeal 
granted, No. 12 CV 793 HB, 2013 WL 3326650 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2013). 
 9. See Internship Litigation Shows No Signs of Cooling, EMP’RS GUIDE TO THE FAIR LAB. 
STANDARDS ACT NEWSL. (Thompson Info. Servs.), July 2014, at 7 (discussing the flood of cases 
concerning unpaid interns and making suggestions on how employers should respond).  
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II. BACKGROUND 
To analyze and propose a solution that addresses the legal 
uncertainty over unpaid internships, the laws that are the source of the 
uncertainty must first be discussed.  The Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) establishes mandatory minimum wage and maximum hour 
requirements for most employees in the United States.10  An unpaid 
private sector intern may be exempt from the FLSA’s mandatory 
requirements if the intern is considered a trainee under the Supreme 
Court’s trainee exception.11  However, courts are unsure what standard to 
apply when determining whether an unpaid intern is a trainee—creating 
legal uncertainty.12  The following section discusses the FLSA,13 how it 
applies to interns,14 and the inconsistent standards courts apply when 
determining whether unpaid interns are employees under the FLSA.15 
A. Federal Wage and Hour Laws 
1. Enactment of Minimum Wage and Maximum Hour Laws 
Before the enactment of the FLSA in 1938, employees endured harsh 
conditions in the unregulated workforce.  In Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel 
The Jungle, Sinclair focused on the abusive and grueling working 
conditions in the United States at the start of the twentieth century.16  In 
the novel, the main character Jurgis Rudkus worked at a 
slaughterhouse.17  Jurgis worked long hours and performed backbreaking 
labor in horrifying conditions.18  In addition to the terrible working 
conditions, Jurgis barely received enough in wages to survive.19  Because 
of the horrible working conditions and unsustainable wages, Jurgis 
eventually lost his home and family,20 became an alcoholic,21 and ended 
                                                          
 10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
 11. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 153 (1947). 
 12. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 16. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Russ Castronovo ed., Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford World’s 
Classics ed., 2010) (1906). 
 17. Id. passim. 
 18. Id. passim. 
 19. Id. at 98–99. 
 20. Id. at 169–72. 
 21. Id. passim. 
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up living on the streets.22 
 While The Jungle is a work of fiction, its story is rooted in reality.  
During the early twentieth century, the economic concept of “sweating” 
drove the discussion for minimum wage legislation in the United 
States.23  From 1923 to 1933, there was increasing pressure by public 
interest groups to address the issue of sweating through legislative or 
judicial measures.24  At the time, one advocate for anti-sweating 
measures said, “[s]tarvation wages have come to be so prevalent that an 
insistent demand has again arisen for minimum wage legislation to put a 
stop to such ruthless exploitation . . . .”25 
Before the Great Depression, insufficient wages were a prevailing 
problem in the United States.  When the Great Depression began in 1929, 
it significantly exacerbated the problem.  For example, in 1929 the 
average weekly earnings for an individual working in the manufacturing 
industry was $25.03.26  By 1933 that average had dropped to $16.73—a 
staggering 33.2 percent decline in weekly earnings over a four-year 
period.27 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed the issue in 1933 when he 
referred to the threat of persistently falling wages as “a serious form of 
unfair competition against other employers, reduc[ing] the purchasing 
power of the workers and threaten[ing] the stability of the industry.”28  
To address the problem, President Roosevelt’s Secretary of Labor, 
Frances Perkins, wrote a bill proposing minimum wage and maximum 
hour provisions for employees.29  In 1937, President Roosevelt sent the 
bill to Congress for a vote30 and endorsed the bill as a means to give “all 
our able-bodied working men and women a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s 
work.”31  After some back-and-forth in Congress, Congress eventually 
passed the bill and President Roosevelt signed it into law as the FLSA on 
                                                          
 22. Id. at 212–13. 
 23. See NORDLUND, supra note 1, at 2 (quoting Rudolf Broda, Minimum Wage Legislation in 
the United States, 17 INT’L LAB. REV. 24, 24 (1928)) (“[M]inimum wage legislation in the United 
States (1912) sprang from anti-sweating agitation.”). 
 24. Id. at 2–3. 
 25. Id. at 3. 
 26. Id. at 5. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 3. 
 29. Johnathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum 
Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (June 1978), http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/flsa 
1938.htm. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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June 25, 1938.32 
Today, the FLSA provides minimum wage and maximum hour 
protections for employees in the United States.33  All employers who are 
subject to the FLSA must pay their employees a minimum wage of at 
least $7.25 an hour.34  Furthermore, employers subject to the FLSA 
cannot require their employees to work more than forty hours a week 
unless they pay their employees one and one-half times their regular pay 
rate for every additional hour in excess of forty hours.35  Congress 
created the Wage and Hour Division as the regulatory agency tasked 
with enforcing the FLSA’s minimum wage and maximum hour 
provisions.36  The Wage and Hour Division exists as a division within the 
larger DOL administrative agency.37  In addition to minimum wage and 
hour protections, the FLSA provides other protections for workers, such 
as prohibiting child labor and requiring equal pay.38 
The FLSA’s wage and hour provisions apply to private sector 
employers and their employees through the Commerce Clause.39  The 
provisions cover private employees engaged in interstate commerce or in 
the production of goods for interstate commerce,40 as well as private 
employees employed by an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce or 
in the production of goods for interstate commerce, with annual sales 
greater than $500,000.41   
The interstate commerce provisions of the FLSA create a very broad, 
far-reaching application of the FLSA to employer-employee 
relationships.  Under the FLSA, work that consists of a purely local, 
isolated activity does not meet the FLSA’s interstate commerce 
requirement; however, “[a]ny regular contact with commerce, no matter 
how small, will result in coverage.”42  This minimal contact standard 
                                                          
 32. Id. 
 33. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012). 
 34. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C). 
 35. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 204. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 212, 206(d). 
 39. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET. AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 625 (4th ed. 2009) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court upheld the FLSA against commerce clause and due process attacks.”). 
 40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1). 
 41. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(i)-(ii); see also Padilla v. Manlapaz, 643 F. Supp. 2d 298, 299 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“These two distinct types of coverage are termed ‘individual coverage’ and 
‘enterprise coverage’. . . .”). 
 41. Williams v. Henagan, 595 F.3d 610, 621 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Sobrinio v. Med. Ctr. 
Visitor’s Lodge, Inc., 474 F.3d 828, 829 (5th Cir. 2007)). 
 42. Williams v. Henagan, 595 F.3d 610, 621 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Sobrinio v. Med. Ctr. 
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means the FLSA’s requirements apply to the majority of private sector 
employers and employees in the United States.  Furthermore, the FLSA 
is a remedial statute so the Supreme Court has held that any exemptions 
from the FLSA should be “narrowly construed against the employer.”43 
While these commerce provisions extend the FLSA’s wage and hour 
requirements to states, Congress has allowed states to establish their own 
minimum wage and maximum hour laws through the FLSA.44  A savings 
clause in the FLSA allows states to establish a minimum wage higher 
than the FLSA’s mandated minimum wage and a maximum workweek 
lower than the FLSA’s mandated maximum workweek.45  Therefore, if a 
state law creates minimum wage and maximum hour requirements that 
are more beneficial to employees than the FLSA’s requirements, the 
state’s requirements replace the FLSA’s requirements; however, if the 
state law’s requirements are less beneficial to employees, a conflict 
exists, and the FLSA preempts the state law.46  The conflict preemption 
only applies to private sector employer-employee relationships covered 
by the FLSA; however, most private sector employer-employee 
relationships are covered by the FLSA through the Commerce Clause.47 
In addition to private employees, the FLSA also applies to public 
employees regardless of whether they are involved in interstate 
commerce.48  The FLSA’s definition of public employees includes 
individuals employed by the Government of the United States,49 
individuals employed by the United States Postal Service,50 and certain 
individuals employed by a state.51  The FLSA’s application to state and 
local government employees is fairly complex.52 
                                                          
Visitor’s Lodge, Inc., 474 F.3d 828, 829 (5th Cir. 2007)). 
 43. Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 694 (3d. Cir. 1994) (citing Arnold v. Ben 
Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)). 
 44. Daniel Dorris, Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State Wage-and-Hour Law Claims, 
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1255–56 (2009). 
 45. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (2012). 
 46. See id. (providing that the law does not excuse non-compliance with another law that 
establishes a higher minimum wage or a lower maximum workweek); see also Baxter v. M.J.B. 
Investors, 876 P.2d 331, 336–37 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
 47. See Duke v. Birchfield, 222 F. Supp. 258, 261 (E.D. Okla. 1963) (“Commerce, as defined 
by Congress for the purpose of the Act, is a broad term . . . .”). 
 48. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)–(e); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 
556–57 (1985) (stating that Congress’s power to enforce wage and hour provisions under the FLSA 
on state agencies is not limited by the Commerce Clause). 
 49. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(A). 
 50. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(B). 
 51. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C). 
 52. Generally, private parties cannot enforce Commerce Clause-based statutes, such as the 
FLSA, against states in federal or state courts.  However, federal agencies, such as the Department of 
 
2015] UNPAID INTERNSHIPS 457 
2. Employer-Employee Relationship under the FLSA 
For the FLSA’s provisions to apply to an individual, the individual 
must be an employee under the FLSA.  The FLSA defines employees as 
“any individual employed by an employer.”53  It defines employ as “to 
suffer or permit to work.”54  It defines employer as “any person acting 
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 
employee;”55 and, a person is defined as “an individual, partnership, 
association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, or any 
organized group of persons.”56  Therefore, an individual is an employee 
under the FLSA if an employer suffers the individual to work, or permits 
the individual to work, in the interest of the employer.  If an individual 
wants to bring a claim under the FLSA, the individual must prove the 
existence of this employer-employee relationship.57 
While this definition of an employer-employee relationship uses very 
broad, general terms, courts have shed some light on when an employee-
employer relationship exists under the FLSA.  To determine whether an 
employer-employee relationship exists, courts look at the “economic 
reality” of the work relationship.”58  Courts evaluate the economic reality 
of a work relationship on a case-by-case basis by considering relevant 
factors that may determine the nature of the relationship.59  As illustrated 
by the Second Circuit, the most important factor in determining the 
nature of the relationship is “control.”60 
The Second Circuit has said that an alleged employer’s ability to 
control a worker is the key factor for determining whether the economic 
reality of the relationship is that of an employer-employee relationship.61  
The Second Circuit uses two tests to determine whether an alleged 
                                                          
Labor, may enforce the FLSA’s provisions against states and state agencies. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 
39, at 664.  Additionally, several amendments to the FLSA exempt certain state and local individuals 
from the definition of employee, so the FLSA does not apply to them.  Id. at 664–69.  This includes 
individuals performing “volunteer” service for state and local governments.  Id. at 666 (referring to 
“volunteers” as defined under 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)). 
 53. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). 
 54. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 
 55. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 
 56. 29 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
 57. Urban v. Cont’l Convention & Show Mgmt., 68 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. 1955). 
 58. Barfield v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961)). 
 59. Id. at 141–42. 
 60. See Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the 
main concern in determining whether an individual is an employer is the “power to control the 
workers in question”). 
 61. Id. at 135. 
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employer has control over a worker.  The first test is the formal control 
test.62  The formal control test considers four factors.  The four factors 
are “whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the 
employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or 
conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of 
payment, and (4) maintained employment records.”63  This test may 
show an alleged employer exercised enough formal control over a 
worker to establish employer status under the FLSA.64  If the formal 
control test does not show that an alleged employer had formal control 
over a worker, courts next consider whether an alleged employer had 
functional control over a worker, which may also establish employer 
status under the FLSA.65 
The second test is a functional control test that considers factors that 
may show an alleged employer had sufficient functional control over a 
worker.66  In the absence of formal control, functional control may 
establish employer status under the FLSA because the FLSA does not 
require absolute, formal control by an employer over an employee for an 
employer-employee relationship to exist.67  An employer-employee 
relationship may still exist under the FLSA even if the employer’s 
control is restricted, nonobvious, or rarely exercised.68  The functional 
control test considers six factors to determine if functional control exists:   
(1) whether [alleged employer’s] premises and equipment were used 
for the plaintiffs’ work; (2) whether the [alleged employer] had a 
business that could or did shift as a unit from one putative joint 
employer to another; (3) the extent to which plaintiffs performed a 
discrete line-job that was integral to [the alleged employer’s] process of 
production; (4) whether responsibility under the contracts could pass 
from one subcontractor to another without material changes; (5) the 
degree to which the [alleged employer] or [its] agents supervised 
plaintiffs’ work; and (6) whether plaintiffs worked exclusively or 
predominantly for [the alleged employer].69 
Together, the formal control test and the functional control test 
                                                          
 62. Copantitla v. Fiskardo Estiatorio, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 253, 308–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 63. Id. at 308 (citation omitted). 
 64. Id. at 308–09. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 309.  
 67. See Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that 
employer status does not require “continuous monitoring of employees, looking over their shoulders 
at all times, or any sort of absolute control of one’s employees”). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Copantitla, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (citation omitted). 
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provide courts with a set of overlapping factors to determine whether an 
alleged employer had enough control to qualify as an employer.70  While 
control is generally the most important factor courts consider, they may 
also consider other factors they think are relevant to determine whether 
an alleged employer is an actual employer under the FLSA.71 
If employer status is established within the context of a work 
relationship, a worker’s employee status will also likely exist.  This is 
because the FLSA simply defines employee as “any individual employed 
by an employer.”72 Therefore, an FLSA employer-employee relationship 
is established almost exclusively by establishing employer status.73 
While the FLSA extends wage and hour protections to employees 
who are “employed by an employer,”74 there are some narrow exceptions 
to the term employee.  Workers exempt from the FLSA’s wage and hour 
requirements include students or trainees,75 independent contractors,76 
volunteers,77 and some white-collar workers.78  For internships, the most 
significant exception is the student or “trainee” exception.  The volunteer 
exception generally applies only to “public sector [organizations] or . . . 
non-profit, non-commercial organizations.”79  Therefore, the only way 
private, for-profit organizations may hire an intern without paying the 
                                                          
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  See also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 631 (discussing several factors, in addition to 
control, applied by courts to determine the economic reality of a work relationship, such as “. . . (2) 
the extent of the relative investments in equipment and material; (3) the worker’s opportunity for 
profit and loss through managerial skill; (4) the skill initiative required by the work; (5) the 
permanence of the relationship; and (6) the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of 
the alleged employer’s business”). 
 72. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012).  Within the definition of “employee,” the term “employed” is 
not expressly defined, but “includes to suffer or permit to work.”  29 U.S.C § 203(g). 
 73. See e.g., Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the 
employer’s control is “central to deciding” whether the employer is liable to the employee under the 
FLSA for unpaid wages). 
 74. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). 
 75. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 633–34 (listing six criteria that differentiate a trainee from an 
employee). 
 76. See id. at 631 (discussing the economic reality test used by courts to determine whether an 
individual is an employee or independent contractor).   
 77. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)–(5) (providing that, “[t]he term ‘employee’ does not include any 
individual who volunteers to perform services for a public agency” or “individuals who volunteer 
their services solely for humanitarian purposes to private non-profit food banks”). 
 78. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (“[A]ny employee employed in a bona fide executive, 
administrative, or professional capacity . . . or in the capacity of outside salesman.”).  See also 
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 651–59 (discussing the “white-collar exemptions” and various 
regulations enacted by the Department of Labor to determine when a “white-collar” employee is 
exempt from the FLSA’s wage and hour requirements). 
 79. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 634. 
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intern minimum wages is if the intern is a trainee under the FLSA.80  The 
Supreme Court established the trainee exception in Walling v. Portland 
Terminal Co.,81 which held that trainees are not employees under the 
FLSA, and therefore not entitled to minimum wage and maximum hour 
protections.82  Unpaid interns have traditionally fallen under the trainee 
exception, however, the practice of hiring unpaid interns and simply 
assuming that they are trainees has recently come under attack.83  
Increasing litigation has led to increasing uncertainty over what standard 
courts should apply to determine whether an unpaid intern is a trainee, 
and thereby exempt from the FLSA’s minimum wage and maximum 
hour protections. 
3. Administrative Law under the FLSA 
In addition to the FLSA, Congress created the DOL as the regulatory 
agency tasked with enforcing labor and employment legislation.84  The 
Secretary of Labor is the head of the DOL and its purpose is to “foster, 
promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the United 
States, to improve their working conditions, and to advance their 
opportunities for profitable employment.”85  Congress has given the 
Secretary of Labor several enforcement actions by which to enforce the 
FLSA’s minimum wage and maximum hour provisions, including the 
right to sue on behalf of affected employees,86 seek injunctive relief to 
prevent further violations,87 and impose civil penalties up to $1,100 for 
repeated or willful violations.88  Within the DOL, Congress established 
the Wage and Hour Division.89  The Administrator of the Wage and Hour 
Division is under the direction of the Secretary of the DOL, and the 
Administrator’s primary purpose is to monitor wage and hour issues 
                                                          
 80. See, e.g., Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 530–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), 
reh’g granted in part, No. 11 Civ. 6784 WHP, 2013 WL 4834428 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2013), mot. to 
certify appeal granted, No. 11 Civ. 6784 WHP, 2013 WL 5405696 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013) 
(applying the trainee exception analysis to the question of whether an unpaid intern was a trainee 
under Portland Terminal). 
 81. 330 U.S. 148, 153 (1947). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Internship Litigation, supra note 9, at 7. 
 84. 29 U.S.C. § 551 (2012). 
 85. Id. 
 86. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 674 (referring to 29 U.S.C. § 216(c)). 
 87. Id. (referring to 29 U.S.C. § 217). 
 88. Id. at 676 (referring to 29 U.S.C. § 216(e)(2)). 
 89. 29 U.S.C. § 204. 
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implicated by the FLSA.90 
Similar to other administrative agencies, Congress has delegated 
rule-making authority to the DOL through the Administrative Procedures 
Act.91  The DOL publishes regulations that interpret the FLSA.92  These 
regulations generally “have the force of law”93 and the DOL publishes 
the regulations in section 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations.94  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that these Federal Regulations 
are generally “given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”95  In addition to these 
formal regulations, the DOL also publishes informal advisory or opinion 
letters stating how it would interpret and resolve issues arising under the 
FLSA.96  Unlike the formal regulations, these letters do not have the 
force of law and the Supreme Court generally does not give them high 
deference when interpreting the FLSA.97 
B. Interns under the FLSA 
The FLSA generally prohibits individuals from performing 
uncompensated work or services for the benefit of for-profit private 
sector businesses.98  The main exception to this rule is the trainee 
exception.  Under the trainee exception, trainees are not employees under 
FLSA, therefore trainees are not entitled to the minimum wage and 
maximum hour protections under the FLSA.99  If a for-profit, private 
sector business wants to lawfully hire and employ an unpaid intern, the 
intern must qualify as a trainee under the trainee exception.  The 
Supreme Court established the trainee exception in Walling v. Portland 
                                                          
 90. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 673. 
 91. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 92. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 673; see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 775.0–775.1 (2014). 
 93. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 39, at 673. 
 94. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 500–899 (2014). 
 95. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 96. See, e.g., Fact Sheet # 71: Internship Programs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION (April 2010) [hereinafter Fact Sheet], 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf. 
 97. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586 (2000). 
 98. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 206 (2012) (outlining the mandatory minimum wage that employers 
must pay employees).  However, the FLSA generally does not prohibit individuals from performing 
uncompensated work or services for the benefit of state or government agencies.  See 29 U.S.C. § 
203(4)(A). 
 99. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947) (holding that railroad 
trainees were not employees under the FLSA and explaining that the FLSA was not created to 
penalize businesses for providing instruction that mostly benefits the trainee). 
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Terminal Co.100  Since Portland Terminal, Congress has not enacted any 
statutory provisions codifying the trainee exception within the FLSA.  
Additionally, the DOL has not enacted any formal regulations that 
interpret when a worker is a trainee or intern under the FLSA; however, 
the DOL has issued informal opinion letters that attempt to interpret how 
the trainee exception should apply to interns.101  The DOL’s opinion 
letters have led to disagreement among the various Circuits over what 
standard to apply when determining whether an intern qualifies as a 
trainee.102 
1. Portland Terminal Establishes the Trainee Exception 
In 1947, the Supreme Court created the trainee exception in Walling 
v. Portland Terminal Co.103  In Portland Terminal, the Court addressed 
the issue of whether unpaid individuals performing on-the-job training 
qualify as employees entitled to minimum wages under the FLSA.104  In 
Portland Terminal, uncompensated trainees brought suit against a 
railroad to seek compensation for their time spent training.105  The 
railroad was training the individuals to determine whether it would 
consider hiring them for brakemen employment positions.106  Before the 
railroad hired an applicant as a brakeman, the railroad required that an 
applicant complete seven or eight days of a preliminary training 
course.107  The training course instructed the trainees on how to do the 
work, and then had them do real work under supervision.108  If the trainee 
completed the course satisfactorily and demonstrated competence in the 
task, the railroad placed the trainee’s name on a list the railroad would 
draw names from when it needed workers.109  The trainees did not 
                                                          
 100. Id. 
 101. See, e.g., Fact Sheet, supra note 96. 
 102. See, e.g., Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(employing a primary benefit test in finding that students working in school run nursing home were 
not employees); Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir. 1993) (utilizing the 
six factor test in holding that firefighters in training were not employees); Donovan v. Am. Airlines, 
Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 271–72 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing one court’s three-criteria test and the 
Department of Labor’s six factors to determine that flight attendant trainees were not employees). 
 103. Walling, 330 U.S. at 148. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 149. 
 106. Id. at 149–50. 
 107. Id. at 149. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 149–50. 
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receive any pay or compensation for their time in the training program.110  
The trainees brought suit against the railroad alleging that they were 
entitled to minimum wage compensation under the FLSA.111 
In its opinion, the Court tried to determine whether the trainees were 
employees under the FLSA as a result of being “employ[ed]” by the 
railroad.112  The Court found that the trainees did not displace any of the 
railroad’s regular employees and did not expedite the railroad’s work, 
but rather, the trainees actually impeded the railroad’s work in some 
circumstances.113  Furthermore, the Court said the FLSA’s definition of 
employ (“to suffer or permit to work”) did not qualify all persons who 
perform work as employees under the FLSA.114  If that were the case, 
then “all students would be employees of the school or college they 
attended, and as such entitled to receive minimum wages.”115  The Court 
reasoned that these trainees were like students who were receiving free 
training for their own benefit.116  Additionally, the railroad received no 
“immediate advantage” from the work performed by the trainees.117  
Thus, the Court distinguished a trainee from an employee, and 
established the trainee exception to the FLSA’s definition of 
employee.118 
2. DOL’s Opinion Letters on Interns 
Using Portland Terminal’s rationale for exempt trainees,119 the Wage 
and Hour Division of the DOL issued an opinion letter in 2010 applying 
the trainee exception to interns.120  The opinion letter, Fact Sheet #71, set 
out a six-factor test for determining “whether interns must be paid the 
minimum wage and overtime under the FLSA for the services that they 
provide to ‘for-profit’ private sector employees.”121  The letter stated that 
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if all six factors of the test are met, then there is no employment 
relationship and the FLSA’s minimum wage and maximum hour 
provisions would not apply to the intern.122  The letter also stated that the 
determination depends on “all of the facts and circumstances of each 
such [internship] program.”123  The six factors of the test are: 
1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the 
facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would be given in 
an educational environment; 
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern; 
3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but works under 
close supervision of existing staff; 
4. The employer that provides the training derives no immediate 
advantage from the activities of the intern; and on occasion its 
operations may actually be impeded; 
5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the 
internship; and 
6. The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not entitled 
to wages for the time spent in the internship.124 
In September 2013, the DOL issued another opinion letter, this time 
to the American Bar Association, addressing the issue of law students 
working as unpaid interns at for-profit private law firms.125  The letter 
applied the same six-factor test as Fact Sheet #71; however, it tweaked 
some of the prongs, elaborated on all of them, and added an additional 
pro bono requirement.126  Regarding the “no immediate advantage” 
prong, the DOL said law students may work as unpaid interns at for-
profit law firms, as long as they work exclusively on non-fee-generating, 
pro bono activities.127  For the pro bono work requirement, the letter said 
interns’ work activities may not “involve potential fee-generating 
activities . . . billable work or free up staff resources for billable work 
                                                          
public agency). 
 122. Fact Sheet, supra note 96. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Letter from M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to Laurel G. 
Bellows, Immediate Past President, ABA (Sep. 12, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/images/news/PDF/MPS_Letter_reFLSA_091213.pdf [hereinafter ABA Intern Letter]. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. 
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that would otherwise be utilized for pro bono work . . . .”128  The letter 
also said firms cannot derive an immediate advantage from interns’ 
activities; however, they can derive “long-term benefits such as general 
reputational benefits associated with pro bono activities.”129  The letter 
concluded by saying its analysis does not apply to law school 
graduates.130 
While the DOL has the power to enforce the FLSA’s provisions,131 
its opinion letters serve only as persuasive authority.132  The letters do 
not have the weight of statutory law or administrative regulations.133  
Courts may consider the DOL’s letters in intern-employee matters; 
however, they are not required to adhere to the letters’ recommendations 
when deciding a case.134  Some courts have applied the advisory letters’ 
six-factor test when determining whether unpaid interns qualify under 
the trainee exception,135 while other courts have dismissed the DOL’s 
opinion letters altogether.136 
3. Courts Split on What Standard to Apply to Interns 
Courts are undecided on what standard to apply for determining 
whether an intern may be exempt from the FLSA.  The Sixth Circuit has 
disregarded the DOL’s six-prong test and instead applies a primary 
beneficiary test.137  The Fifth Circuit has adopted the six-prong test and 
seemingly applies the six prongs as all or nothing elements.138  The Tenth 
Circuit has also adopted the six-prong test; however, rather than applying 
the six prongs as elements, it applies the six prongs as factors, which it 
considers within the “totality of the circumstances.”139  The Second 
Circuit has not decided the issue; however, it recently heard the issue on 
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 131. Yamada, supra note 119, at 227. 
 132. Id. at 229–30. 
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 134. Id. 
 135. See, e.g., Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), reh’g 
granted in part, No. 11 Civ. 6784 WHP, 2013 WL 4834428 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2013), mot. to 
certify appeal granted, No. 11 Civ. 6784 WHP, 2013 WL 5405696 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013). 
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 138. Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 139. Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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appeal and the parties are awaiting the decision.140  The appeal came 
from two separate cases in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, in which the lower courts adopted the 
six-prong “totality of the circumstances” standard.141  The fact that 
several courts have adopted different standards illustrates the significant 
amount of legal uncertainty that currently surrounds unpaid internships. 
a. The Primary Beneficiary Test 
In Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, Inc.,142 the Sixth 
Circuit adopted a primary beneficiary test to determine whether an intern 
or trainee is an employee under the FLSA.  Solis involved students at 
Laurelbrook boarding school in Tennessee.143  Laurelbrook structured 
their educational program to educate students in a traditional academic 
setting as well as in a practical, hands-on setting.144  As part of the 
practical learning, students worked in a nursing home operated by 
Laurelbrook.145  The students spent half their time on classroom learning 
and half their time on practical nursing skills.146  Staff members 
supervised the students while they participated in the practical training.147  
Neither the school nor the nursing home paid the students, nor were the 
students entitled to a job at the nursing home after graduation.148 
After learning of the program, the Secretary of the DOL brought a 
claim against Laurelbrook for violating the child labor provision of the 
FLSA.149  The secretary sought injunctive relief against future violations 
by the school.150  The district court denied the Secretary’s request for 
relief on the basis that the students were not employees under the FLSA, 
                                                          
 140. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.: Chamber Urges Second Circuit to Adopt Primary 
Benefits Test as Standard to Determine Whether Interns are Employees under the Fair Labor 
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and therefore not subject to the FLSA’s child labor provisions.151 
The issue on appeal was whether the student workers were 
employees under the FLSA.152  First, the court said that simply labeling 
the student workers as “students at a vocational school” was not, on its 
own, sufficient to find that the students were exempt trainees rather than 
employees under the FLSA.153  Next, the court considered what test it 
should apply to determine whether the students were trainees or 
employees.154 
The first test the court considered was the DOL’s six-prong test.155  
The court interpreted the six-prong test as a standard that could only be 
satisfied if all six prongs of the test were met.156  The court found the 
test’s all or nothing application to be a poor method for determining 
employee status in an intern-training situation.157  The court believed it 
was too rigid and failed to consider the totality of the circumstances of 
the situation, therefore the court rejected the six-prong test and adopted 
the so-called primary beneficiary test.158 
The primary beneficiary test determines a student’s (or intern’s) 
status under the FLSA by looking at the educational or training situation 
involved and determining if the student was the primary beneficiary of 
the work performed.159  If the student received the primary benefit of the 
work through the educational value received, the student is considered a 
trainee and is therefore exempt from the FLSA.160  However, if the 
employer received the primary benefit of the relationship, the student is 
considered an employee who is entitled to wages under the FLSA.161  
The Solis court believed the primary benefit test was more consistent 
with Portland Terminal’s trainee exception than the DOL’s six-prong 
test.162  Additionally, the court believed the primary benefit test was the 
best way to distinguish between interns and employees under the 
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FLSA.163 
Applying the primary benefit test to the facts in the case, the court 
found that both parties received benefits from the work performed, 
however, some of the benefits were offset by the students not displacing 
paid workers and instructors spending extra time supervising the students 
instead of being able to perform their own work.164  Furthermore, the 
court found that the students received significant tangible benefits such 
as hands-on training, and significant intangible benefits such as a well-
rounded education and life lessons on the value of hard work.165  
Weighing the benefits received by both parties, the court found that the 
students received the primary benefit of the school’s training program, 
and therefore were not employees under the FLSA.166 
b. The Six-Prong Test 
Courts are split on how to actually apply the DOL’s six-prong test to 
interns and trainees.  Some courts have applied the six-prongs as six 
elements in an “all or nothing” approach, where all of the points must be 
met to consider the intern a trainee.167  Other courts have applied the six 
points as six factors that should be considered within the “totality of the 
circumstances.”168  Under the totality of the circumstances approach, the 
court may give any factor more or less weight than the other factors, and 
all six factors do not have to be met for the intern to be considered a 
trainee. 
Some of the confusion over how to apply the six points can likely be 
attributed to the contradictory language contained in the DOL’s Fact 
Sheet #71.  Fact Sheet #71 says “[i]f all of the factors listed above are 
met, an employment relationship does not exist,” but also says “[t]he 
determination of whether an internship or training program meets this 
exclusion depends upon all of the facts and circumstances of each such 
program.”169  The first line’s language (“all of the factors must be met”) 
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 164. Id. at 530–31. 
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 167. See Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 686 F.2d 267, 273 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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(S.D.N.Y. 2013), mot. to certify appeal granted, 12 CV 793 HB, 2013 WL 3326650 (S.D.N.Y. June 
27, 2013) (“While the weight to be given to these factors is far from crystal clear, the Fact Sheet 
adds to the confusion with the introductory language: ‘whether an internship or training program 
meets this exclusion depends upon all of the facts and circumstances of each such program.’”). 
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suggests an all or nothing application, while the second line’s language 
(“depends on all the facts and circumstances”) suggests weighing the six 
points within the totality of the circumstances.170 
i. All or Nothing Application of the Six-Prong Test 
An all or nothing application of the six-prong test creates a difficult 
standard for employers trying to hire unpaid interns because they would 
have to satisfy all six points.  The language of the DOL’s Fact Sheet #71, 
stating “[i]f all of the factors listed above are met, an employment 
relationship does not exist under the FLSA,” seems to imply a six-
element, all or nothing application.171 
In Donovan v. American Airlines, Inc.,172 the Fifth Circuit appeared 
to interpret the DOL’s six-prong test as an all or nothing test.  The issue 
in Donovan was whether job applicants for American Airlines were 
employees under FLSA during their preliminary job training.173  Several 
thousand applicants applied for the flight attendant positions and of those 
thousands of applicants, American Airlines only selected approximately 
800 for training.174  Once American Airlines selected the applicants, the 
company told the applicants they would have to go to Dallas to attend the 
required flight attendant training.175  If the selected applicants completed 
the training, American Airlines still did not guarantee them a job, 
although the assumption was that they would receive a job offer.176  
American Airlines did not pay the applicants but it did provide their 
meals and housing for the duration of the program.177  The training lasted 
forty hours a week over the course of four to five weeks.178  The training 
took place in classrooms and mock-up aircraft facilities, and the 
applicants did not supplement the work of, or take the place of, any 
American Airlines employees.179  The Secretary of Labor brought action 
against American Airlines, claiming that the training applicants were 
employees under the FLSA and therefore entitled to minimum wages.180 
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The Donovan court applied Portland Terminal’s trainee standard to 
determine whether the applicants were trainees or employees.181  
Applying Portland Terminal, the Donovan court concluded that the 
applicants were trainees, and therefore not entitled to minimum wages.182  
The court supported its conclusion with the DOL’s six-prong test.183  The 
court applied the six-prong test to the American Airline training 
program, stating: 
The trainees here are not employees by each of those criteria: the 
training is similar to that given at vocational schools; the training is for 
the benefit of the trainees; the trainees do not displace regular 
employees and work under close observation; the employer derives no 
immediate benefit from the training; the trainees are not necessarily 
entitled to a job at the conclusion of the training, and the employer and 
the trainee understand that no wages will be paid for the training.184 
According to the six-prong test, the trainees were not employees.185  
Donovan did not expressly state that the test was an all or nothing test; 
however, that could be reasonably inferred by the court pointing out that 
“each of those criteria” was satisfied.186 
ii. Totality of the Circumstances Application of the Six-Prong Test 
The more common application of the six-prong test is one that 
considers the totality of the circumstances.  The totality of the 
circumstances application views all six prongs of the test as separate, 
individual factors to be considered with the totality of the circumstances 
when determining whether an intern is exempt from the FLSA.  The 
Tenth Circuit187 and the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York188 have both adopted the totality of the circumstances application. 
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The Tenth Circuit applied the totality of the circumstances six-prong 
test in Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District.189  In Reich, the 
Secretary of Labor brought suit against a firefighting training academy, 
Parker Fire Protection District (Parker).190  The Secretary brought the suit 
on behalf of four firefighters who trained at the academy, but were not 
paid for their time at the training academy.191  The Secretary claimed that 
the trainees were actually employees entitled to minimum wages under 
the FLSA.192  Both the Secretary and Parker agreed that the DOL’s six-
prong test was the proper standard to apply; however, they disagreed 
over how the test should be applied.193  The Secretary argued that the test 
should be applied as a strict “all or nothing standard,” while Parker 
argued that the test should be applied as a “totality of the circumstances 
test” and that the court’s determination “should not turn on the presence 
or absence of one factor in the equation.”194 
The court began its analysis by saying it was not required to give a 
high level of deference to either the DOL’s six-prong test or the 
Secretary’s interpretation of how the test should be applied.195  The court 
acknowledged that Portland Terminal supported the six-prong test, 
however it did not believe Portland Terminal supported a strict all or 
nothing application of the six-prong test.196  Furthermore, the court 
believed that the DOL’s language in its interpretation of the six-prong 
test supported a totality of the circumstances approach.197  The court said 
the six prongs were relevant for consideration but were not absolute, 
determinative elements for deciding whether a trainee is an employee 
under the FLSA.198  Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that the six-prong 
test should be applied as a totality of the circumstances test rather than an 
all or nothing test.199 
In 2013, two cases in the Southern District of New York also applied 
the totality of the circumstances six-prong test—Xuedan Wang v. Hearst 
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Corporation200 and Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.201  These cases 
are significant because they are the first high-profile cases in which 
unpaid interns, rather than job applicants or trainees, sued employers 
over unpaid wages. 
In Wang, the issue was whether a group of unpaid interns had been 
illegally misclassified as interns (rather than employees under the FLSA) 
and wrongly denied compensation.202  Xuedan Wang was the lead 
plaintiff for a class of plaintiffs who worked as unpaid interns for Hearst 
Corporation (Hearst) in New York, one of the largest magazine 
publishers in the world.203  The plaintiffs’ duties at Hearst included a 
wide variety of activities including: researching articles online, 
responding to emails, organizing files, running errands, and other office 
activities.204  The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the 
issue of whether they were employees under the FLSA.205 
In its decision, the court acknowledged that the term intern is not 
defined or listed as an exception to the term employee anywhere in the 
FLSA.206  Therefore, the court said that Portland Terminal’s trainee 
exception was the controlling standard for whether an intern is an 
employee under the FLSA.207  For guidance on the Portland Terminal 
standard, the court looked to the DOL’s Fact Sheet #71, which “put[] 
some meat on the [Portland Terminal] bones.”208  The court adopted the 
six-prong test; however, it was unsure how much weight to give to each 
part of the test and was confused by the language used by the DOL in 
Fact Sheet #71.209  One part of the Fact Sheet said that the determination 
“depend[ed] upon all of the facts and circumstances of each such 
program” while another part said that an employment relationship did not 
exist “[i]f all of the factors listed above [were] met . . . .”210  The 
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plaintiffs argued for an “immediate advantage” standard, claiming that 
when an employer gains an immediate or direct advantage from his or 
her interns, the interns have been “suffered or permitted [to] work” under 
the FLSA and must be compensated for the work.211  Alternatively, if the 
court did not apply the proposed immediate advantage standard, the 
plaintiffs argued for an all or nothing standard of application for the six-
prong test.212  The defendant argued that the standard should be a 
“balancing of the benefits test” which looked at the “totality of the 
circumstances to evaluate the ‘economic reality’ of the relationship.”213 
The Wang court agreed with the defendants and found the totality of 
the circumstances to be the correct standard.214  The court chose the 
totality of the circumstances approach because it was similar to the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Portland Terminal.215  The court said that 
Portland Terminal did not establish a one-dimensional test, but rather a 
totality of the circumstances test.216  Therefore, the court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument that the standard should be either a one-dimensional 
“immediate advantage” standard or an “all or nothing” standard of 
application of the DOL’s six-prong test.217 
Furthermore, the Wang court’s opinion implied that the totality of the 
circumstances standard considers circumstances outside of the DOL’s 
six-prong test.218  However, the court did not altogether dismiss the six-
prong test because it thought the six-prong test provided a framework for 
a totality of the circumstances analysis.219  Therefore, the court 
essentially adopted a totality of the circumstances application of the 
DOL’s six-prong test and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment because a “genuine dispute and material issues of fact 
exist[ed], at least with respect to the first, second, third, and fourth 
factors.”220 
Approximately one month after the Wang decision, Glatt v. Fox 
Searchlight Pictures brought another claim of illegal unpaid internships 
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before the Southern District of New York.221  Two of the plaintiffs in 
Glatt were unpaid interns who worked on the production set for the film 
Black Swan.222  The primary defendant in the case was Fox 
Entertainment Group, Inc. (Fox).223 
The plaintiff’s claim focused on Fox’s unpaid internships.224  Fox 
hired the plaintiffs as unpaid interns.225  The plaintiffs claimed they were 
victims of an internship program that used interns to perform work that 
would have required Fox to hire paid employees if not for the work done 
by the interns.226  The plaintiffs claimed that Fox violated the FLSA by 
misclassifying them as unpaid interns, when in reality they were 
employees entitled to wages.227  Both parties moved for summary 
judgment and the court granted the plaintiffs’ summary judgment 
motion, finding that the plaintiffs were misclassified as interns and 
should have been classified as employees and paid wages in accordance 
with the FLSA.228 
In the opinion, the court had to determine whether the plaintiffs were 
employees under the FLSA.229  Since the FLSA’s definition of employee 
is “any individual employed by an employer,” the court said the plaintiffs 
would be deemed employees unless they fit into the narrow trainee 
exception established in Portland Terminal.230  The Second Circuit had 
never decided an unpaid intern case, so the court had no guiding 
precedent and had to decide which test to apply to determine whether the 
interns fit into the narrow trainee exception.231  First, the court 
considered the Sixth Circuit’s primary beneficiary test.232  It found the 
test to be too “subjective and unpredictable.”233  The court also believed 
the test was not supported by Portland Terminal.234 
Next, the court considered and ultimately adopted the DOL’s six-
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prong test.235  The court found the six-prong test to be supported by 
Portland Terminal because Portland Terminal established a “narrow 
exception to an expansive definition.”236  The six-prong test created a 
much narrower trainee exception than the primary beneficiary test and 
considered some of the same factors the Supreme Court considered in 
Portland Terminal.237  The Glatt court also adopted the six-prong test 
because the test was created by the agency responsible for enforcing the 
FLSA, thus entitling it to deference over other tests.238 
In applying the test, the court deviated slightly from the language in 
the DOL’s letter.  The letter seemingly required that all six prongs be met 
to qualify for the exception.239  The court disagreed with this application, 
and instead adopted the totality of the circumstances approach, under 
which no single factor was controlling.240  Applying the six prongs of the 
test to the totality of the circumstances of the case, the court found the 
plaintiffs did “not fall within the narrow ‘trainee’ exception to the 
FLSA’s broad coverage.”241  The plaintiffs were not receiving any 
educational value from the internship because they were performing 
basic tasks that did not require any skills, such as operating the copy 
machine and making coffee.242  While the plaintiffs did benefit somewhat 
from the intern program, the employer (Fox) received the primary benefit 
from the program by obtaining free labor from the plaintiffs.243  By 
performing free labor for Fox, Fox did not have to hire paid employees to 
perform the work or pay existing employees for extra time worked; 
therefore, the plaintiffs were displacing regular employees.244  While the 
plaintiffs understood they were not entitled to wages, the court gave very 
little weight to this factor because the plaintiffs could not waive their 
right to wages under the FLSA and Fox had the superior bargaining 
power in the relationship.245  Therefore, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the court held that the plaintiffs did not fall into the 
“narrow ‘trainee’ exception to the FLSA’s broad coverage” and were 
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employees entitled to wages.246 
III. ANALYSIS 
As the litigation over unpaid internships has increased, so has the 
level of uncertainty regarding what standard courts should apply to 
determine the legal status of interns.  Courts cannot settle on a clear, 
consistent standard, which has led to the uncertainty.  The legal 
uncertainty over internships is problematic for employers, interns, and 
the overall job market.  To resolve this lingering uncertainty, the DOL 
should enact a regulatory provision that establishes a standard for 
determining whether an intern is exempt from the FLSA’s minimum 
wage and maximum hour provisions.  The standard imposed by the 
regulation should be a modified version of the all or nothing six-prong 
test. 
A. The DOL Should Enact a Formal Regulation that Creates a Modified 
All or Nothing Six-Prong Test for Determining Whether an Intern is 
Exempt from the FLSA 
The DOL should enact a regulatory provision that uses a modified 
version of the DOL Fact Sheet’s six-prong test, applied in the all or 
nothing manner, so that each part is applied, and all prongs must be met 
for an intern to be exempt from the FLSA.  A regulation enacting a 
modified version of the all or nothing six-prong test would establish a 
reliable standard by clarifying the second and fourth element of the 
test.247  This improved six-prong test would adhere to the trainee 
exception in Portland Terminal and give more legal weight to the 
standard by being enacted as a formal regulation rather than an advisory 
or opinion letter. 
1. A Modified Version of the All or Nothing Six-Prong Test Would 
Establish a Reliable Standard 
To enact a reliable, clear standard, the six-prong test should be 
enacted as an all or nothing six-prong test with changes made to the 
second and fourth element to improve the test’s objectivity and clarity.  
The all or nothing six-prong test is superior to both the primary 
beneficiary test and the totality of the circumstances six-prong test 
                                                          
 246. Id. 
 247. See infra Part III.A.1. 
2015] UNPAID INTERNSHIPS 477 
because it is more objective and predictable than the other two tests.  It is 
more objective and predictable because six, clearly defined prongs must 
all be met for an intern to be exempt from the FLSA.  To improve the all 
or nothing six-prong test, the second element should be amended to “the 
internship experience benefits the interns.”248 The fourth element should 
be amended to “the employer derives no immediate advantage from the 
intern’s activities, meaning that the intern’s activities do not: i) generate 
revenue or billable hours for the employer, ii) free up the employer or 
paid employees to work on more profitable activities, or iii) allow the 
employer to pursue any activities that the employer derives an advantage 
from, when the employer would not have pursued that activity, but for 
the activities of the intern.”249  In its entirety, this modified all or nothing 
six-prong test would read: 
 In the case of for-profit private sector internships or training 
programs, all six of the following elements must be satisfied in order to 
show that an employment relationship does not exist under the FLSA: 
1) the internship, even though it includes actual operation of the 
facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would be 
given in an educational environment; 
2) the internship experience benefits the intern; 
3) the intern does not displace regular employees, but works under 
close supervision of existing staff; 
4) the employer derives no immediate advantage from the intern’s 
activities, meaning that the intern’s activities do not: i) generate 
revenue or billable hours for the employer, ii) free up the employer 
or paid employees to work on revenue generating or more 
profitable activities, or iii) allow the employer to pursue any 
activities that the employer derives an advantage from, when the 
employer would not have pursued that activity, but for the 
activities of the intern; 
5) the intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of 
the internship; and 
6) the employer and the intern understand that the intern is not 
entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship. 
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If one of these six elements are not satisfied, then an employment 
relationship exists and the intern or trainee is an “employee” under the 
FLSA. 
This improved six-prong test would create a reliable standard by 
being applied as an all or nothing six-prong test rather than a primary 
beneficiary test or a totality of the circumstances six-factor test.  Of the 
three tests applied by the different circuits, the all or nothing six-prong 
test is the most predictable and most objective. 
First, the all or nothing six-prong test is more predictable and reliable 
than the primary beneficiary test because the primary beneficiary test is 
highly subjective and unpredictable.  The court in Glatt recognized the 
problem of subjectivity when it rejected the primary beneficiary test.250  
Under the primary beneficiary test, if the intern receives the primary 
benefit of the relationship, then no employment relationship exists and 
the intern is not entitled to minimum wages or other protections under 
the FLSA.251  This test is highly subjective and impossible to predict.  
The primary benefit a party receives from an employment relationship is 
based entirely on that party’s own, subjective perspective. 
For example, assume a college student, Jake, is hired as an unpaid 
intern at a large record label.  Jake works about 30 hours a week, is not 
receiving college credit, and his only duties are performing unskilled, 
remedial tasks such as making coffee or organizing files.  However, 
every Thursday Jake receives the subjective benefit of getting to meet 
and talk to his favorite musician, Mick Jagger, for five to ten minutes 
when Mick comes into the office for his weekly meeting.  Applying the 
primary beneficiary test to this scenario, Jake’s employer, the record 
label, may only receive about $218 worth of free labor each week;252 
however, Jake’s subjective benefit of getting to meet his favorite 
musician each week may surpass the record label’s $218 weekly benefit.  
Therefore, under the primary beneficiary test, a court could find that Jake 
was the primary beneficiary and that he is not entitled to minimum wages 
or any other protections under the FLSA.  Jake would not be considered 
an employee despite the fact that he was performing activities the record 
label would otherwise have to pay an employee to perform, was not 
receiving any educational value, was not receiving any college credits, 
all while providing a material, monetary benefit to the record company 
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and only receiving immaterial benefits in return.  This illustrates the 
subjective nature of the test and how it could be construed in favor of 
unpaid labor.  Additionally, the test is unpredictable and unreliable for an 
employer trying to implement an unpaid internship program that 
complies with the law because an employer will not know beforehand 
what a court may determine are benefits to each party and what weight a 
court will give to those benefits.  A hundred different courts could apply 
the primary beneficiary test to the same set of facts, and be split as to 
who the primary beneficiary is in the relationship. 
The all or nothing six-prong test is also more predictable and reliable 
than the six-factor “totality of the circumstances” test.  The method of 
application of the same six criteria is significant because the two 
applications create two completely different tests that could reach two 
different outcomes when applied to the same fact pattern.253  The totality 
of the circumstances test is flawed because it creates the same subjective, 
unpredictable test as the primary beneficiary test.  Courts are free to give 
more or less weight to any of the six separate factors, or even to 
completely disregard any of the factors they do consider important.254  
The second factor—whether the internship was for the benefit of the 
intern—can also undermine the six-factor test by converting it into the 
primary beneficiary test, if the court gives the second factor predominant 
weight over the other factors.  Glatt illustrated this potential problem 
when it identified the defendants as the “primary beneficiaries of the 
relationship.”255  Like the primary beneficiary test, the totality of the 
circumstances application of the six-prong test does not provide the 
parties in a work relationship with a reliable, predictable standard for 
when an intern may be considered an employee under the FLSA. 
The only problem with the all or nothing six-prong test is that two of 
its elements are subjective and unclear.  The second element currently 
requires that “[t]he internship experience is for the benefit of the 
intern.”256  Unlike the totality of the circumstances application, the all or 
nothing application of this test removes the possibility that this element 
could turn the entire test into a primary beneficiary test.  However, the 
second element is still a subjective element that depends on the 
subjective balancing of who benefits the most from the relationship.  It 
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could also turn the all or nothing six-prong test into the primary 
beneficiary test as applied against an employer.  Effectively, if a court 
believed that the employer received the primary benefit of the 
relationship, even if it was by the slimmest of subjective margins, then 
one of the six prongs would fail and an employment relationship would 
exist.  The other five elements would be irrelevant.  Once again, this 
would create a de facto primary beneficiary test rather than a six-element 
test.  Employers would still have a hard time predicting how a court 
would determine if the internship was for the benefit of the intern.  If the 
employer received even the slightest benefit from the relationship, the 
court might find that the internship experience was not for the benefit of 
the intern. 
To address this problem, the DOL should change the second element 
to require that “the internship experience benefits the intern.”  This 
would change the second element from a subjective, unpredictable 
standard to a much more objective, predictable standard.  Employers 
would know before they hired the intern what standard they would have 
to meet to satisfy the element.  They would not have to worry about 
somehow failing to satisfy the element if they received any subjective 
benefit from the intern.  They would simply have to ensure that the 
internship experience benefitted the intern, and that they also complied 
with the other five elements.  By changing the standard from “for the 
benefit of” to “benefits,” the second element still achieves its desired 
goal of making sure the intern receives a benefit from the internship, 
without undermining the other five elements.  The concern that the 
employer may receive significant advantages at the intern’s expense is 
addressed by the fourth “no immediate advantage” element. 
The fourth element currently requires that “[t]he employer that 
provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities 
of the intern; and on occasion its operation may actually be impeded.”257  
The DOL should modify this element because it is unclear and does not 
sufficiently protect interns from being taken advantage of by employers.  
The most important goal of the intern standard is that it is clear, reliable, 
and predictable to all the parties in the relationship.  “Immediate 
advantage” is an ambiguous and subjective term that is open to 
interpretation.  To give clear meaning to this subjective term, the DOL 
should improve upon this element by drawing from language in their 
advisory letter to the American Bar Association concerning law students 
who work as unpaid interns on pro bono activities at for-profit law 
                                                          
 257. Id. 
2015] UNPAID INTERNSHIPS 481 
firms.258  In the letter, the DOL explained that law firms that hire law 
students as unpaid interns will not derive any “immediate advantage” 
from the interns if the interns work only on pro bono matters that do not 
involve potential fee generating activities.259  The DOL further explained 
that “immediate advantage” also meant that interns could not participate 
in work that “free[ed] up staff resources for billable work that would 
otherwise be utilized for pro bono work.”260 
This concept of opportunity costs is not clear or obvious when 
someone considers what constitutes “immediate advantage,” however, 
using an unpaid intern to avoid the opportunity costs of a paid employee 
performing pro bono work instead of income generating work confers a 
significant immediate advantage to the employer.  If a law firm has 
committed itself to performing a certain amount of pro bono work every 
week, the time that the firm’s paid attorneys and other employees spend 
working on that non-billable work is time they cannot spend generating 
revenue by working on billable work.  By hiring an unpaid intern to 
perform the non-billable work, the firm’s paid attorneys are freed up to 
work on billable work, and thereby generate revenues they would not 
have had the opportunity to generate if not for the intern.  Therefore, 
even though the intern is performing non-billable work, the firm is still 
profiting off the intern, just as if the intern were performing billable 
work.  The firm is gaining an “immediate advantage” from the intern’s 
work. 
This potential loophole in the fourth element should be closed by 
expressly stating what constitutes an “immediate advantage.”  The fourth 
element should be changed to, “the employer derives no immediate 
advantage from the intern’s activities, meaning that the intern’s activities 
do not: i) generate revenue or billable hours for the employer, ii) free up 
the employer or paid employees to work on revenue generating or more 
profitable activities, or iii) allow the employer to pursue any activities 
that the employer derives an advantage from, when the employer would 
not have pursued that activity, but for the activities of the intern.” 
This amended fourth element would clarify how an employer could 
gain an immediate advantage from an intern’s activities.  The first part of 
the amended fourth element addresses having the intern work on billable 
work.  The second part addresses interns performing non-billable work 
that frees up employees to work on revenue generating activities.  The 
                                                          
 258. See ABA Intern Letter, supra note 125. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
482 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
third part is a broader, catch-all provision that is aimed at preventing 
employers from using interns for non-revenue generating activities that 
benefit the employer in some other way.  This third part would 
encompass goodwill activities, which the employer would not have done 
had the employer not had access to the intern’s free labor.  An example 
of this would be if a company used unpaid interns to perform charitable 
work that would generate goodwill for the company in the public eye, 
but the company never previously intended to allocate paid resources 
(employees) to perform the charitable work.  Overall, this amended 
fourth element creates a clear, predictable standard for employers and 
interns as to what “immediate advantage” means.  It also prevents 
employers from taking advantage of unpaid interns by using them as 
revenue or goodwill generating human capital. 
A regulatory provision that utilized the all or nothing six-prong test 
with amendments made to the second and fourth prong would be the best 
standard for the DOL to enact because it would provide a clear, 
predictable standard for determining when an intern is exempt from the 
FLSA. 
2. An Amended Version of the All or Nothing Six-Prong Test Would 
Adhere to the Trainee Exception in Portland Terminal 
The DOL should also enact an amended version of the all or nothing 
six-prong test because it would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
trainee exception in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.261  The petitioners 
in Portland Terminal were applicants for brakemen positions with the 
railroad, who had gone through a training program so they could be put 
on a list to be considered for hire.262  The petitioners were not paid 
minimum wage and brought a claim against the railroad alleging a 
violation of the FLSA.263  The Court held that the petitioners were not 
employees entitled to minimum wages because they were trainees 
exempt from the FLSA.264  This established the “trainee exception” 
under the FLSA—the same legal authority that excludes legally unpaid 
interns from the FLSA.265  Therefore, a regulation establishing an intern 
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exemption should be consistent with Portland Terminal’s trainee 
exception.  The amended all or nothing six-prong test is consistent with 
Portland Terminal’s trainee exception because the Court in Portland 
Terminal used the same six prongs in its analysis and the Court did not 
expressly apply either an all or nothing or a totality of the circumstances 
approach to the six-prong test. 
The first reason the amended version of the all or nothing six-prong 
test complies with the Portland Terminal trainee exception is because the 
Supreme Court used the same six prongs in its analysis.  For the first 
prong, the Court acknowledged that the railroad trainees received the 
same kind of instruction at the railroad as they would have received had 
they “taken courses in railroading at a public or private vocational 
school . . . .”266  For the second prong, the Court noted that the railroad 
provided the trainees with training “free of charge” which “most greatly 
benefit[ed] the trainees.”267  For the third prong, the Court said the 
trainees’ activities did “not displace any of the regular employees.”268  
For the fourth prong, the Court found the railroad received “no 
‘immediate advantage.’”269  For the fifth prong, the Court discussed how 
trainees had to complete the training course to be “included in a list from 
which the company can draw when [the trainee’s] services are needed,” 
but that it was not guaranteed that the trainees on the list would be 
selected.270  For the sixth and final prong, the Court found that the 
railroad never “undertook [efforts] to pay” the trainees and “the trainees 
[never] expected to receive” any pay for their training.271 
Looking at the DOL’s six-prong test from Fact Sheet #71, it is clear 
the DOL took their “six criteria” directly from Portland Terminal.272  If 
the second element and fourth element of the six-prong test were 
amended for clarity, those amended elements would still adhere to the 
Court’s language in Portland Terminal.  By changing the second element 
from “for the benefit of the intern” to “benefits the intern,” the element 
still fits within the Court’s consideration that the training “most greatly 
benefit[ed] the trainee.”273  Nowhere does the Court say that the training 
must be solely for the benefit of the trainee.  Furthermore, the phrase 
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“most greatly” seems to acknowledge that the training may actually 
benefit the railroad by giving them a pool of qualified applicants to select 
from when work is needed.274  An amended second element would not 
contradict, and may actually more closely follow Portland Terminal’s 
consideration of who benefitted from the trainee relationship.  
Additionally, amending the fourth element by clarifying what constitutes 
an “immediate advantage” would not contradict Portland Terminal’s 
language, because the Court did not expound on immediate advantage, 
and the proposed amendments to the fourth element all clearly constitute 
an immediate advantage to the employer. 
Courts that have interpreted Portland Terminal as adopting a primary 
beneficiary test rather than a six-prong test have misinterpreted Portland 
Terminal.  In Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, Inc.,275 the 
Sixth Circuit incorrectly interpreted Portland Terminal as having applied 
a primary beneficiary test.  Solis based its support for the primary 
beneficiary test on Portland Terminal’s finding that “the training ‘most 
greatly benefit[ed]’ the trainees” and “accepting the unchallenged 
findings . . . that the railroad receive no ‘immediate advantage’ from any 
work done by the trainees.”276  Solis interpreted the other five 
considerations as “various other facets of the relationship” but concluded 
that the ultimate decision rested upon “whether the trainees received the 
primary benefit of the work performed.”277  Solis’ interpretation of the 
“most greatly benefit[ed]” language and “immediate advantage” 
language in Portland Terminal as creating a primary beneficiary test is 
misguided.  If anything, the language in Portland Terminal created a 
two-part test or a no immediate advantage test, but it did not create a 
primary beneficiary test.  Additionally, nowhere in the Portland 
Terminal decision does the Court say or even suggest that the trainee 
exception hinges on who receives the primary benefit of the relationship.  
The primary beneficiary interpretation of Portland Terminal is incorrect, 
and therefore the six-prong test adheres to Portland Terminal’s trainee 
exception. 
The all or nothing application of the amended six-prong test also 
adheres to Portland Terminal’s trainee exception because it does not 
contradict Portland Terminal’s application of the six-prongs of the test.  
The all or nothing application does not contradict Portland Terminal 
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because Portland Terminal did not expressly apply an all or nothing or 
totality of the circumstances approach.  While several courts have 
interpreted Portland Terminal as having adopted a totality of the 
circumstances approach,278 the fact remains that the Court did not say 
how or in what manner it was applying the six criteria.  Therefore, while 
an all or nothing application of the amended six-prong test may not be 
expressly supported by Portland Terminal, it also does not expressly 
contradict Portland Terminal. 
3. Enacting an Amended Version of the All or Nothing Six-Prong Test 
as a Regulatory Provision Would Give Sufficient Force to the 
Standard 
While the amended all or nothing six-prong test is the proper test to 
apply to determine whether interns are exempt from the FLSA, the 
proper way to enact the test is for the DOL to enact it as a published 
regulation under section 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations.  This 
regulation would create an exception for interns from the term employee 
under the FLSA.279  The DOL should enact the intern exception as a 
regulatory provision because it could enact the rule more quickly and 
easily than Congress could enact a statutory amendment and courts 
would still give high deference to the formal regulation. 
Although they are not binding statutory law, formal regulations are 
usually given a high level of deference by courts.  In Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,280 the Supreme Court 
established a two-step test for determining when a court should defer to 
an administrative agencies’ regulatory interpretation of a statute.  The 
first step under Chevron is “whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
of the matter; because the court, as well as the agency, must give effect 
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”281  If the regulation 
survives the first step, the second step is “if the statute is silent or 
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ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.”282  For the second step, a reasonable approach to 
determining whether an agency’s regulatory interpretation of a statute is 
permissible is to ask whether the interpretation is arbitrary and 
capricious.283 
Applying Chevron’s two step analysis to the amended all or nothing 
six-prong test, the regulation would be interpreting the very ambiguous 
term employee under the FLSA.  For the first step, the statute is 
ambiguous and Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue, which is whether interns are exempt from the FLSA as non-
employees.  Therefore, it would likely survive the first step.  For the 
second step, the all or nothing six-prong test would likely be based on a 
permissible construction of the statute, because the Supreme Court 
constructed the statute similarly in Portland Terminal and Congress has 
not tried to change or enact a provision in the FLSA that would change 
Portland Terminal’s trainee exception.  Additionally, the amended six-
prong test does not seem arbitrary or capricious because it is aimed at 
addressing a legitimate problem that has persisted for decades.  Based on 
Chevron deference, an all or nothing six-prong regulation enacted by the 
DOL would almost certainly be given high deference by courts.  
Additionally, the intern exception could be enacted as a regulation much 
easier and much faster than as a statutory provision, which would sooner 
address the issue of uncertainty. 
B. Possible Effects the Regulatory Provision May Have on Internships 
If the DOL enacted a regulatory provision that established a clear, all 
or nothing six-prong standard to determine when an intern is an 
employee under the FLSA, it would likely affect internships and the job 
market in the United States.  Four things would likely happen as a result 
of the regulatory provision.  First, the regulatory provision would likely 
limit the amount of costly litigation over internships by providing parties 
with a tangible legal rule to comply with.  Second, the regulatory 
provision would likely eliminate most clearly illegal internships.  Third, 
the regulatory provision would likely save some legitimate internship 
programs that employers might have otherwise eliminated.  Finally, the 
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regulatory provision would likely lead to significant changes in how 
private sector internships are implemented and operated, which could 
lead to more job opportunities for low-income students.  While the all or 
nothing six-prong regulatory provision would lead to some positive and 
negative consequences, overall, the regulatory provision would likely 
have a positive effect on employers, interns, internships, and the job 
market. 
1. Decrease Litigation 
An all or nothing six-prong regulatory provision would likely limit 
the amount of costly litigation involving internships.  In the wake of 
Glatt and Wang, there has been a firestorm of lawsuits filed by former 
interns against their former employers.284  Courts have responded to the 
litigation by applying different, inconsistent standards to determine when 
an intern is an employee under the FLSA.285  These inconsistent 
standards have failed to bring any legal certainty to the issue that might 
stem the tide of intern lawsuits.  Additionally, these inconsistent 
standards have resulted in the possibility that the statute of limitations 
may be extended for intern claims in some cases;286 therefore, large 
class-action suits will likely linger in a state of uncertainty as long as the 
legal standard for internships remains unresolved.287 
An all or nothing six-prong regulatory provision would establish a 
greater degree of certainty than currently exists.  The proposed 
regulatory provision creates greater certainty by laying out six, easily 
understood elements that all must be met.  Generally, more legal 
certainty leads to less litigation.  This premise is supported by an 
empirical study done by Steven Scott Stephens in which Stephens found 
that sufficiently clear and predictable laws are not litigated as often as 
unclear, inefficient laws.288  Clear and predictable laws are not litigated 
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because people voluntary follow them.289  These efficient laws “settle[] 
disputes rather than caus[e] them.”290  On the other hand, inefficient and 
unclear laws that lead to uncertain results are more heavily litigated 
because they are open to debate and the opportunity to be changed 
through interpretation.291  Furthermore, not only do inefficient laws lead 
to more lawsuits being filed, they also lead to lengthier, more expensive 
litigation.  This occurs as a result of parties “fighting it out” over 
uncertain, inefficient laws.292  The greater the level of uncertainty, the 
greater the difference in parties’ expectations of the outcome, and the 
more likely they will fight a case all the way to a judgment.293  Even risk-
adverse parties will fight a case to judgment if their difference in 
expectations of the outcome is great enough.294 
In this instance, the trainee exception as it applies to interns is an 
inefficient law because it is unclear and unpredictable.  Parties do not 
know which standard courts will apply to determine whether an intern is 
an employee; therefore, employers and interns expectations of how a 
court may rule on an intern’s status under the FLSA may differ 
significantly.  Both sides could look at the same fact pattern and each 
believe they have a ninety percent chance of winning.  As a result of this 
significant difference in expectation of the law’s application, both parties 
may expend an excessive amount of resources fighting their case through 
the extensive pre-trial discovery stage, trial stage, and possibly the 
appeals process.  This consideration illustrates how inefficient the trainee 
exception law is, and how much economic waste its inefficiency is 
causing.  As long as the law is unclear and unpredictable, heavy litigation 
will continue, regardless of how strong or frivolous a case may be.  By 
establishing a clear, predictable all or nothing six-prong regulatory 
provision defining interns under the FLSA, the currently inefficient law 
will become much more efficient.  This will help weed out frivolous 
claims from legitimate claims—preventing senseless, expensive 
litigation.  Furthermore, it will provide employers and interns with an 
efficient law to guide their future conduct, which will limit the amount of 
legal claims in the future. 
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2. Reduce the Amount of Illegal Internships 
An all or nothing six-prong regulatory provision will also eliminate a 
large number of illegal internships.  This effect logically follows the first 
effect regarding litigation: “When a law is sufficiently clear and its 
application sufficiently predictable . . . people voluntarily operate under 
it.”295  A clear, definite test for employers and interns stating what 
conditions an internship must meet for an intern to be exempt from the 
FLSA will remove much of the ambiguity that has led to illegal 
internships.  While it will not eliminate all illegal internships, it will 
likely eliminate the significant portion of illegal internships that are the 
result of an employer’s misinterpretation of the currently ambiguous 
requirements. 
Limiting the number of illegal internships clearly benefits interns by 
preventing instances of employers taking advantage of interns by using 
them for free labor.  It also benefits paid employees by eliminating a 
source of market place competition against which paid employees cannot 
compete—workers who work for nothing.  Eliminating a large number of 
illegal internships should free up more paying, employee jobs that unpaid 
interns are currently taking off the job market.  This will benefit 
prospective employees by creating more job openings and increasing 
prospective employee’s bargaining power with employers.  Freeing up 
paying jobs could also benefit the overall U.S. job market and may 
actually lower the unemployment rate. 
While the benefits of limiting illegal internships are fairly obvious, 
there is also a downside associated with less illegal internship in the 
market place.  An internship may be illegal without being evil or 
oppressive.  For example, an intern may receive benefits from an 
internship outside of compensation or educational training.  Many unpaid 
internships provide interns with the opportunity to meet people and 
establish important connections within their desired job field.  A college 
student may be passionate about working in a certain lucrative industry, 
however, jobs the industry may be extremely difficult to obtain and may 
not be willing to pay an intern or take on the educational burden 
requirements of hiring an unpaid intern.  The only way to enter the 
lucrative industry may be through an unpaid position.  However, a 
regulatory provision may eliminate these opportunities for students 
because the unpaid positions would be clearly illegal, and therefore no 
longer exist, despite students’ willingness to work without pay. 
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These types of unpaid internship positions are common in 
competitive industries like journalism and finance;296 however, they 
could disappear as result of a strict, clearly defined standard for legal 
unpaid internships.  An intern cannot waive his or her minimum wage or 
maximum hour rights under the FLSA.297  Therefore, if an unpaid 
internship failed to meet all six of the requirements, it would be illegal, 
regardless of an intern’s intentions or subjective benefits received from 
the position.  The strict, all or nothing six-prong regulatory provision 
would likely eliminate several of these fringe internships because of the 
high standard it creates.  While this may prevent abuse in some 
circumstances, it may also increase the barrier for students trying to 
break into their desired field. 
3. Preserve Legitimate Internships 
In addition to decreasing litigation and reducing the number of 
illegal internships, an all or nothing six-prong regulatory provision will 
likely save some legitimate, legal unpaid internship programs.  In light of 
the recent litigation and legal uncertainty surrounding unpaid internships, 
some companies have simply cancelled their internship programs 
altogether.298  The legal uncertainty is discouraging all types of 
internships,299 both legal and illegal, and some legal internship programs 
will likely end as a result of the uncertainty.  This is an unfortunate 
consequence because legal internships, paid or unpaid, provide 
significant benefits to both employers and interns.  An all or nothing six-
prong regulatory provision may provide employers with a high enough 
degree of legal certainty to prevent them from discontinuing their 
internship programs.  This could effectively save several legitimate, legal 
internships that currently provide significant benefits to both employers 
and interns. 
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Internships benefit employers in ways other than simply providing 
cheap labor.  One way employers benefit from internships is that the 
programs provide employers with a more work ready, experienced pool 
of job applicants.  Employers are looking to hire employees that have 
experience working in a real-world setting.  They are often hesitant to 
hire college graduates who do not have experience outside of the 
classroom.  A 2010 survey by the Association of American Colleges and 
Universities found that “73 percent of employers stated the desire for 
higher education to put more emphasis on ‘the ability to apply 
knowledge and skills to real-world settings through internships and other 
hands-on experiences.’”300  Internships are one of the best ways for 
college students to receive real-world knowledge and skills before 
entering the job market.  Employers also benefit from internships 
because they help employers identify talent that will be a good 
organizational fit within a company.301  Studies show that employee 
retention rate is higher for employees who have previously interned with 
a company, as opposed to employees who did not previously intern with 
a company.302  Thus, internships give employers a way of identifying 
talented employees who fit well with their company, while also 
minimizing turnover costs. 
The benefits received from internships are not a one-way street.  
Interns also receive significant benefits from their internships, regardless 
of whether they are paid or unpaid.  Internships provide interns with 
experience and real-world skills that make them more employable and 
increase their likelihood of finding full-time employment.  When 
evaluating job candidates, employers are beginning to expect some type 
of internship experience.  Internships have become increasingly 
prevalent among college students303 as employers look for applicants 
with work experience outside of the classroom.304  Real-world experience 
can be difficult for college students to obtain.  Internships provide a way 
for college graduates to bridge the experience gap between the classroom 
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and the workplace.  Statistics support this proposition, as a recent study 
conducted through the career services office at Southwestern University 
found that students who completed one internship while in school were 
“13 percent more likely to find full-time employment over those that did 
not.”305 
In addition to providing college students with workplace experience, 
internships also provide students with a way to figure out what type of 
work they enjoy and where they want to work.  Similar to the benefit 
employers receive from finding job candidates that are a good fit within 
their organization, students can also use internships as a way to “test 
drive” a company to see if it is somewhere they would like to work full-
time.  The Southwestern University study also found that students who 
completed an internship were happier with their job outcomes than 
students who did not complete an internship, which could be attributed to 
the interns finding an occupation they enjoyed before committing to it.306 
4. Increase Job Opportunities for Low-Income Students 
An all or nothing six-prong regulatory provision would also likely 
lead to significant changes in how private sector, for-profit internships 
are structured.  By requiring employers to meet the high standard 
established by the all or nothing six-prong test, employers who 
previously hired unpaid interns might decide to simply pay interns rather 
than worry about complying with the provision.  If the regulatory 
provision led to more paid internships, it could lead to more internship 
opportunities for low-income students.  Conversely, if the regulatory 
provision caused a net decrease in the overall number of internships in 
the private sector, third parties might increase funding for internship 
programs. 
The all or nothing six-prong regulatory provision may lead to more 
paid internships in the private sector.  Under the proposed standard, 
employers would have to meet six objective requirements to ensure they 
are complying with the law.  This would impose a much greater 
compliance burden on employers than the less stringent primary 
beneficiary test or the totality of the circumstances test.  To comply with 
this standard, employers would have to implement expensive oversight 
and compliance measures.  Furthermore, the time and effort an employer 
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would expend trying to create an “educational environment” that 
“benefits the intern” could create efficiency costs for employers that limit 
the productivity of the employers’ staff.  Employers may conclude that 
the significant costs of complying with an unpaid internship outweigh the 
costs of paying interns a minimum wage salary.  Employers may also 
consider the minimum wage costs to be insignificant when compared to 
the substantial long-term benefits employers receive from hiring interns, 
such as identifying talented job candidates and reducing turnover.307  
These considerations could incentivize employers to pay interns a 
minimum wage instead of hiring unpaid interns or discontinuing 
internship programs. 
If the proposed regulatory provision led to more paid internships, it 
would likely increase the amount of internship opportunities for low-
income students.  One of the major criticisms of unpaid internships is 
that they disproportionately favor the wealthy.308  Students who come 
from high-income families have the financial resources to work as an 
unpaid intern, whereas low-income students do not have the financial 
resources necessary to work for no pay and still support themselves.309  
Consequently, unpaid internships provide high-income students with 
more opportunities and easier access to the job market than low-income 
students.  Therefore, unpaid internships perpetuate the economic divide 
between the haves and the have-nots by “provid[ing] people who already 
have a leg up a way to get the other leg up.”310 
A regulatory provision that effectively increases the number of paid 
internships and decreases the number of unpaid internships could help 
close this socioeconomic gap.  By converting unpaid internships into 
paid internships, low-income students could afford to take intern 
positions that they otherwise could not.  This would create more 
opportunities for low-income students to enter the job market.  It would 
also provide low-income students with more opportunities to receive the 
experience and real-world training employers look for in job 
candidates.311  This would benefit low-income students, but it would also 
benefit employers.  Giving low-income students more access to the job 
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market would allow employers to choose from a larger pool of talented 
candidates.  Employers could base their hires more on a candidate’s 
merits and qualifications rather than candidate’s ability to work for no 
pay.  This does not suggest that the availability of more paid internships 
will put an end to economic inequality in regards to job market 
opportunities, however, it may help close the gap. 
While the proposed regulatory provision may cause some employers 
to convert their unpaid internships into paid internships, other employers 
may choose to discontinue their unpaid internships altogether.  As a 
result, the provision may have a net effect of decreasing the total amount 
of paid and unpaid internships available to students.  In this event, 
internship programs may see an increase in funding from third parties.  
Universities are already taking an active role in funding internships.  Job-
placement rates are a powerful statistic that competing universities use to 
justify their rising tuition costs.312  Because internships lead to jobs, some 
universities have begun providing stipends for students to work as unpaid 
interns at for-profit enterprises.313  A regulatory provision that decreases 
the amount of available internships will likely encourage universities to 
allocate more funds towards these artificially created internships in an 
effort to get their students hired and stay ahead of the competition.  
States have also begun providing subsidies for internships with for-profit 
companies through their state schools.  The Ohio Board of Regents 
recently distributed nearly $11 million dollars to colleges, universities, 
and technical centers throughout the state in an effort to subsidize intern 
wages in high demand industries.314  Additionally, some have proposed 
that federal funds be allocated towards internships though federal student 
loan programs315 or subsidies for low-income students.316   
All of this points to a growing trend toward subsidizing internships 
in an effort to promote job placement and skill training.  A regulatory 
provision imposing a high standard for unpaid internships will increase 
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the incentives for third parties to fund internships because the provision 
will likely decrease the amount of unpaid internships in the market, 
thereby creating a need for more paid internships to fill the gap. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A large number of high-profile lawsuits have highlighted the 
problem of abusive, illegal internships in the private sector.  While 
illegal internships are a serious problem, the source of this problem has 
been legal uncertainty.  For decades, the United States legal system 
failed to establish any legal boundaries for internships and now its court 
system is reaping the consequences.  Congress has failed to provide any 
answers to resolve the uncertainty.  Courts have tried to provide answers, 
but they cannot agree on any consistent legal standards.  Therefore, the 
DOL should provide an answer by enacting a regulatory provision that 
creates a clear standard to determine what constitutes an illegal unpaid 
internship under the FLSA.  If the DOL enacted a regulatory provision, it 
would address the problem of uncertainty surrounding illegal unpaid 
internships and likely have a positive effect on the U.S. job market.  
However, until someone addresses the uncertainty by establishing a clear 
and uniform standard, the problem of unpaid internships, and the costs 
associated with it, will continue to plague employment law in America. 
 
